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Sowards: Painter: Federal Regulation of Insider Trading

BOOK REVIEW
By William H. Painter.'
Pp. 627. $30.00.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING.

lottesville, Va.: Michie.

1968.

Char-

"The longer I operated on Wall Street," wrote Bernard Baruch, "the more
distrustful I became of tips and inside information of every kind. Given time,
I believe that inside information can break the Bank of England." 2 Professor
William H. Painter may not believe that inside information can break the
Bank of England, but he is opposed to securities trading by insiders serving
two masters: their own pecuniary interests and those of investors in the corporation whose securities they buy and sell. When these insiders obtain advance
information, either through their positions as corporate officials or as certain
other persons who have access to the information, Professor Painter characterizes them as fiduciaries. He would hold the insider strictly accountable as
a trustee who has abused his trust to the detriment of the ordinary investor.
Two sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 163 and
section 10,4 as implemented by the controversial rule lOb-5, 5 concern themselves with insider trading. In addressing himself to the cases and problems
produced by this legislation, Professor Painter places special emphasis on
interpretative difficulties and focuses on the leading decision in this field,
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.6
As Professor Painter points out, the main objective of section 16 is to
curb abuse of corporate information not available to the public. Generally
speaking, the first part of that section requires officers, directors, and beneficial owners of more than ten per cent of the registered equity securities of
a company whose assets .exceed $1 million and whose shareholders number
500 or more to file an initial report with the Commission reflecting their
holdings and subsequent reports for any month during which there is any
change in such holdings. The second part of the section provides that shortterm profits from purchase and sale transactions of such equity securities
within the six-month period may be recovered by the company or by any
security holder on its behalf.
Although the statute has been effective for thirty-five years, its current
significance stems from interpretations and refinements of this legislation
and attendant rules and regulations. Professor Painter analyzes fully many
difficult problems engendered by these recent developments. For example, he
notes that a showing of use of inside information is not a condition precedent to recovery. 7 He also discusses computation of profit on a short-swing
1. Professor of Law, University of Missouri at Kansas City.
2.

3.

B. BARUCH, MY OWN STORY 123 (1957).

15 U.S.C. §78 (p) (1958), as amended 15 U.S.C. §7 8 (p) (1964).

4. 15 u.s.c. §78 (j) (1964).
5. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1964).
6. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
7. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943); W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INsMIDER TRADING 12 (1968).
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transaction, the problem of interest (on convertible debt securities) or dividends paid between a purchase and sale, and section 16 as it applies to exchanges, mergers, gifts, and options. Whether the individuals must be insiders at both the time of purchase and sale of the securities in order to be
held accountable and whether conversion of a bond and subsequent sale of
the underlying stock is within the purview of section 16 are investigated.
Additionally, the general market making exemption, section 16 (d), is the
subject of succinct discussion and criticism.
It should be pointed out that, in making some comparisons between
sections 16 and 10 as implemented by rule lOb-5, section 16 (b) is not directly
enforced by the Commission. But under rule lOb-5 the Commission may apply to the appropriate United States district court for an order enjoining
any person from violating the rule; it may bring administrative proceedings
to discipline broker-dealers and it may institute criminal prosecution through
a local United States attorney.
Other comparisons and questions are in order. Section 16 (b) speaks of
"any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase," while the language used
in rule 1Ob-5 is "in connection with the purchase or sale." s Section 16(b)
applies to certain defined insiders (officers, directors, shareholders with more
than ten per cent of the stock, while rule lOb-5 applies to "any person." 9 But
how far does liability under the rule extend? What about friends or other
persons to whom corporate insiders have imparted information, securities
analysts who obtain such information in advance, or a taxi driver who overhears a conversation between two company officials and promptly acts on
the information?o Section 16 (b) applies to the purchase or sale of "any
equity security" while rule lOb-5 is applicable to the purchase of "any security." In addition, section 16 (b) applies only to securities of listed companies or to those of unlisted companies meeting certain statutory standards,
while rule lOb-5 applies even to securities issued in private transactions as
long as the jurisdictional means are used." Accordingly, the rule may come
into play in securities involving closely held corporations. The main purpose of section 16 (b) is the recapture of short-swing profits, but the use of
inside information involving a purchase and a sale even more than six months
later would not spell escape from liability under rule lOb-5. Finally, one who
is liable under section 16 (b), and who has used inside information, may also
be liable under rule lOb-5.
Related problems are constantly presenting themselves. Within the meaning of rule lOb-5, what must be disclosed? Is it necessary that the insider
disclose that he is an insider before he trades? Of course, the fact or facts
8.

17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1964) (emphasis added).

9. In this connection, the Commission included as defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur
an accountant, a geologist, and a general counsel and office manager. Additionally, the
corporation itself was a defendant allegedly having violated rule lOb-5 by issuing a misleading press release.
10. See FORTUNE, July 1965, at 75.
11. Rule lOb-5 may be applicable even when jurisdictional means are not used. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. §517.301 (1967) adopting the rule almost verbatim.
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to be disclosed must be material. Two questions then come to mind. First, is
a fact material if a definitive stage has not been reached? Suppose, for example, that negotiations for a merger are in the preliminary stage. Second,
if a definitive stage has been reached, would the fact be material even though
its disclosure might not reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on
the market price of the security? May an insider or "any person" trade under
these conditions?
Answers to these questions do not come easily, and Professor Painter
wisely does not attempt to give categorical answers. Rather, he furnishes practical guidelines within the framework of existing legislation, rules, regulations, case law, and his own thoughts in this gray area of securities regulation.
The divergence of philosophies that exist on this subject between Professor Painter and Professor Henry G. Manne, a recognized authority on securities regulation, 12 should be considered. Professor Painter will not accept
what he considers to be the essence of Professor Manne's approach to the
problem: that nobody is hurt by insider trading. No attempt is made here to
resolve this conflict between these two eminent authorities, except to state
that perhaps in the last analysis the conflict stems basically from the fact
that Professor Painter is, first and foremost, an attorney and law professor
whereas Professor Manne is primarily an economist and has examined this
area in terms of economic analysis rather than in the traditional legal manner.
Lawyers, observes Professor Manne, tend to examine problems in terms of
a case or lawsuit wherein two parties have antagonistic interests and the
court is called upon to resolve the dispute. Consequently, his argument continues, lawyers almost invariably view a concept such as insider trading in
the context of seeking a statute or rule that will be fair as between two or
more specific persons. But economists have traditionally approached controversies in terms of the total economic effect. Accordingly, an economist
tends to analyze insider trading from the standpoint of how all shareholders
are affected. No less than a careful reading of the writings of both Professors
Manne and Painter will give the reader an intelligent evaluation of the
over-all problem.
Meanwhile, attorneys and businessmen must continue to deal with the
insider trading problem. In his treatise, Professor Painter has made a very
real contribution toward enlightening them in perhaps the most important
segment of the "federal corporation law" of today and tomorrow.
HUGH L. SoWARDs*

12. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
*Professor of Law, University of Miami.
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